GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES IN THE ASIA-EURASIAN REGION: SOME THOUGHTS

GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES IN THE ASIA-EURASIAN REGION: SOME THOUGHTS

Amitav Acharya

(Keynote Address to the The 12th SPF ISSYK-KUL Forum, "CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUSINTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS", Organized by
Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan, Asian Dialogue Society, and International Centre, Goa, India, 5-7 November 2006, The International Centre, Goa, India)


1. I would like to thank the Sasakawa Peace Foundation of Japan and the International Centre, Goa, for inviting me to deliver the keynote address of the Conference. I have been asked to reflect on the main geopolitical challenges in the “Asian-Eurasian” region. Since regional definitions are necessarily arbitrary and the “Asian-Eurasia” is an unconventional and uncertain formulation, I will simplify matters by focusing on the geopolitics of Asia, a more familiar regional concept, but at the same time highlighting, where necessary, its implications for the wider Eurasian area. I would identify five issues of central concern in the emerging Asian geopolitics.

2. The first has to do with the strategic implications of the rising powers of Asia today. A major and historic shift is occurring in the Asian power structure which will shape the geopolitics of the 21st century. For the first time in its history, the region is witnessing the simultaneous rise of three major powers: China, India and in a different way, Japan. What are its implications?

3. To begin with, the unipolar moment in post-Cold War period, if it was ever there, is closing fast. And the region’s multipolar power structure of Asia is causing pessimism. According to pessimists, multipolar structures are far less stable than bipolar or unipolar ones. The larger the number of powerful states, the greater the scope for unpredictability in their security relationships and hence mutual misperception.

4. Asia’s emerging multipolarity, with a rising China and India and resurgent Japan and Russia, the latter due to the jump in oil prices, has invited comparisons between East Asia today to Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century. Then, the rise of Germany upset the balance of power and its challenge to the prevailing status quo maintained by the other European nations was said to have been a major contributing factor to World War I, despite high levels of economic interdependence among the European nations. I am not a believer in this comparison. There are major differences between Europe’s past and Asia’s future. Today, economic interdependence is much deeper, and there are far more avenues of international cooperation, including institutions, available for mitigating conflict among nations. The destructive potential of major power wars are so much greater as to induce a measure of caution among these power in contemplating waging them. Today’s wars are more likely to be asymmetric and less system-threatening. This is no cause for celebration, but should temper the hyper-pessimism of scholars and analysts who believe that post-Cold War Asia would be a natural candidate for a major conflagration.

5. The rise of China has been a central concern for geopolitical analysts. In conventional geopolitical thinking, China is cast as the revisionist power, which is bound to challenge the status quo maintained by the US favouring its continued hegemony. A related concern here is that China might develop regional “spheres of influence” involving its weaker neighbours, such as the Central Asian republics or the Southeast Asian states. Some American analysts have spoken of a Chinese Monroe Doctrine in Southeast Asia, akin to the US Monroe Doctrine of the 19th and early 20th centuries, which sought to exclude European colonial powers out of Latin America and sanctioned US intervention in the internal affairs of regional countries.

6. But the problem with this line of geopolitical analysis is that China is behaving like a status quo power. In many respects, it is more willing to conform to established principles of international relations than the United States under the current Bush administration. Examples of such behaviour include respect for international law, multilateralism, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. China’s growing participation in global and Asian regional institutions is further testimony to the flaws in the “revisionist power” label sometimes attached to it by observers. There is little evidence to suggest that an increasingly globalising China will behave like a revisionist power which would use war to alter the international status quo.

7. Similarly, the prospects for a Chinese Monroe Doctrine in Central and Southeast Asia is flawed, whether one looks at it from a traditional realpolitik thinking or a modern liberal institutionalist perspective. China’s influence in its periphery will grow and will certainly feature countries which are desperate from its assistance due to their political or economic isolation from the outside world, such as Myanmar or Laos. Occasionally, China, like all great powers past and present, will secure allies to secure its strategic interests and advance its power projection capabilities. But even if one assumes that establishing any sphere of influence is a Chinese goal, and there is no proof of this, China also faces significant countervailing power in its neighbourhood such as Russia and the US in Central Asia, and India, Japan and the US in Southeast Asia. As the case of North Korea demonstrated, Beijing’s authority and influence can be defied by its most needy neighbour. And China is neither able nor willing to dominate regional institutions involving its neighbouring states, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

8. On the other side of the coin, some analysts foresee the reemergence Sino-centric Asian regional order which would be based on a benign Chinese hegemony akin to the old tributary system. This is even more far fetched a notion than the idea of Chinese sphere of influence. Once again there are major differences between the geopolitics of the old Tributary system and contemporary Asian security. One has already been alluded. The old tributary system had no challengers comparable to Japan and India today. Second, hierarchy and deference which marked the old tributary system may sound culturally attractive notions of geopolitical behaviour, but today’s world is based on the Westphalian principles of sovereignty equality and non-intervention, principles China itself acutely believes in.

9. In other words history is not an accurate guide to how Asia’s security order will evolve in the 21st century. History can predict both positive and negative outcomes; it’s a source of both optimism and pessimism. But the future geopolitics of Asia will derive mainly from contemporary realities and forces, although the lessons of history should be a guide for all of us in not repeating the mistakes – misunderstanding and miscalculation – that had led to past conflicts.

10. The role of India has received increasing attention from strategic observers and justly so. India is seen as both a future economic powerhouse and a strategic “swing player” in the Asian balance of power. Moreover, its political model of parliamentary democracy has earned it an international respect denied to China with its authoritarian system. But India’s rise cannot be taken for granted, despite its obvious natural and human resource richness and record of political stability. To realise its full potential as a major Asian power and global player, India must overcome problems in its domestic governance, manage if not resolve its myriad internal conflicts, and find the appropriate balance between those societal and political forces who would like to embrace economic reform and globalisation and those who see it as a threat. These are not impossible challenges, but they call for a realism which must be injected into the projection of India’s obvious potential for regional and global leadership.

11. A second challenge to Asian geopolitics comes from the war on terror waged by the US in response to the heaviest casualty suffered by the nation in a single act of violence inside its territory.

12. At a first glance, most Asian powers seem to have gained some geopolitical mileage out of 9/11 and the resulting war on terror. For Japan, 9/11 contributed to a significant strengthening of the US-Japan security relationship. To be sure, this process was already under way, triggered by China’s rise, and North Korea’s nuclear ambition. But the Japanese Government led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi could use the US war on terror as the perfect pretext for carrying out far-reaching changes in Japan’s security policy, including deployment of the Japanese navy in the Indian Ocean in a supporting mission to the US military action against Al-Qaeda and Iraq.

13. China also appears to be a winner in the post-9/11 geopolitics. The American preoccupation with Afghanistan and Iraq detracted attention from the “containing China” agenda of the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration. Beijing not only got a reprieve from the hard line US policy favouring Taiwan. The diversion of US strategic attention to the Middle East theatres also allowed China to quietly build-up its diplomatic clout in Southeast Asia, through a diplomatic charm offensive, notwithstanding the fact that Washington itself had pronounced Southeast Asia as the “2nd front” in the war on terror.

14. India perhaps has gained the most from the war on terror, showcasing itself as a victim of international terrorism, making common cause with the US on the terrorist challenge posed by Taliban and Al Qaeda, strengthening its defence relations with the US and winning recognition from Washington as a de facto nuclear power, thereby moving significantly closer to the realization of its aspiration to great power status. Russia also managed to get understanding if not support from the West over its Chechnya problem by presenting it as a front in thr global war on terror. Pakistan and the Philippines have secured increased US military and economic aid, while Indonesia’s armed forces have restored military links with the US.

15. Yet, on closer reflection, many of the so-called gains have downsides and come with costs. Japan is today less secure than before 9/11, not from the threat of terrorism, but from worsening relations with China brought partly about by Chinese fears of renewed Japanese militarism and North Korea’s march towards nuclear weapons capability, caused by heightened insecurity after it was dumped into the “axis-of-evil” camp with Iraq and Iran.

16. China has lost some influence in central Asia, where the US acquired a number of military facilities for its strike on the Taliban. This foray into China’s backyard undermined Beijing’s painstakingly effort to develop a regional alliance of like-minded states through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, dedicated to fighting China’s three central strategic concerns: “terrorism, separatism and extremism” and Beijing has developed the Shanghai group into a potential challenger to US hegemony in the region.

17. But China’s real problem could be the strengthening of the US-India security partnership. The US decision to accord India the status of a de facto and legitimate nuclear power is a considerable setback for Beijing, which had joined hands with Washington to punish India for its nuclear tests in 1998. Moreover, the de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan in US strategic policy undermines China’s geopolitical strategy in South Asia, which has been centred on backing Pakistan as an equal of India.

18. What about the US itself? The US today enjoys closer security relations in Asia. For the first time in history, India and Pakistan are simultaneously strategic partners of the US and are prepared to follow its lead in world affairs. But America’s diplomatic gain is mainly at the government-to-government level. Its standing at the popular level in Asian societies has taken a beating, notwithstanding the goodwill generated by its extraordinary relief effort in the wake of the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Sympathy for the US after 9/11 attacks and declaratory support for its global war on terror has been undermined by the brute and unilateral exercise of US power, as evident in its attack on Iraq.

19. Moreover, closer security ties between the US and Asian countries that are based on mutual need do not translate into genuine and heartfelt respect for American leadership in world affairs. Here the US has lost much ground as a superpower which could be trusted to make strategic choices backed by prudent calculations of costs and benefits of military action.

20. To sum up, the post-9/11 geopolitics of Asia consists not of winners and losers, but mostly losers. The biggest winners in the post-9/11 era are not states, but those societal forces who espouse and support the terrorist cause. They have been rejuvenated by the excesses of the global war on terror, from Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib to Beirut. It’s the war on terror, rather than terrorism itself, which has worsened Asia’s security environment.

21. A third challenge to Asian security comes from its unresolved regional conflicts, especially the China-Taiwan, Korean Peninsula and Kashmir. These conflicts are in many respects holdovers from the Cold War. But their dynamics have changed in important ways. First, as I will discuss shortly, Kashmir and now the Korean conflict are now nuclearised. Second, the rising power of India and China make the Kashmir and Taiwan conflicts more directly linked to global security.

22. In the immediate to medium-term, the North Korea nuclear proliferation issue will remain the most important challenge to East Asian security. Tensions over the Taiwan issue seems to have cooled off for the moment, but it remains the most serious long-term strategic issue between the US and China. The Kashmir issue is also a long-term challenge to Asian security, to the extent that the improved climate between India and Pakistan is the result of external pressure by the US in the context of the immediate needs of the war on terror. None of the conflicts show any sign of peaceful resolution.

23. A fourth challenge to Asian security today is the security of energy supplies. Asia is fast becoming the locus of global energy security with China and India being two of the fastest growing consumers of oil and gas. Competition between China and India over overseas energy resources has been overplayed, but nonetheless remains a source of friction in their geopolitical relationship. The security of Asia’s strategic sea lanes through which the oil imports must pass is another concern, as these sea lanes, especially the Straits of Malacca, are vulnerable to piracy and terrorist attacks. Others, like the Strait of Hormuz, are vulnerable to disruption and closure during a major international conflict, such a US-Iran confrontation. Attempts to boost global energy security through the construction of oil and pipelines is fraught with dangers and uncertainties, because of political rivalries among the concerned nations and the instability of regions through which these pipelines must pass.

24. Already, concerns about energy security are reshaping the military forces in the region. The Japanese navy today is much more active in the Straits of Malacca, ostensibly in a supportive role for US deployments to Afghanistan and the Gulf, but also spurred by concerns about the safety of its energy supply lifeline through the Straits. Energy security is also driving the Chinese navy’s blue water ambitions and could be a factor in its interest in seeking access to naval bases in the Indian Ocean, thereby prompting concern and response from the Indian navy.

25. The Central Asian region is caught up in the global scramble for energy resources. The Caspian region is increasingly important to the supply of oil and gas for world markets, with oil resources comparable to the North Sea. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, by 2010, the Caspian Sea region could export up to 4 million barrels of oil and 680 million cubic meters of natural gas per day, which although modest relative to the 45 million barrels per day produced by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries members, “still helps to diversify global energy supply, which ultimately contributes to global energy security.” Indeed, “the full potential of the region’s energy resources remains unknown.”

26. A fifth challenge to Asian security today stems from the spread of nuclear weapons. It is no exaggeration to say that we have now entered the 2nd nuclear age. There are important differences between the 1st nuclear age, ushered in by the US nuclear attack on Japan at the end of World War II, and the 2nd nuclear age. Although the 1st nuclear age started in Asia, its main theatre was the Europe and the Atlantic. The 2nd nuclear age is centered in Asia, with the region accounting for the emergence of all the three nuclear weapon states outside of the five recognized powers. A second difference is that the 2nd nuclear age features a wider range of states and regimes, from relatively strong nations like India to nearly failed states like North Korea. This leads to a third difference, the 2nd nuclear age is much more linked to concerns about regime survival, hence politically much more complex and challenging to deal with than its predecessor. The complexity is further underscored by the Bush administration’s policy of regime change, involving the possible use of military force. It would have been unthinkable in the 1st nuclear age for the US to enforce a policy of regime change in its nuclear adversaries, the Soviet Union and China. But this is entirely in the realm of possibility in relation to North Korea, Iran and other would be proliferators in the region.

27. Let me now turn to the issue of regional cooperation. Traditionally, Asia had been inhospitable to multilateral security cooperation. Until the 1990s, the only regional organizations in the region were sub-regional entities, ASEAN in Southeast Asia, and the far less coherent SAARC in South Asia. But the end of the Cold War led to a new momentum towards regional cooperation, with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum on an Asia-Pacific basis and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Eurasia.

28. ASEAN offers a useful model for the developing world, but mainly in terms of its considerable success developing mutual comfort and accepting a long-term commitment not to resort to war as a means of dispute-settlement. ASEAN, or other regional organizations in Asia are more suited for a confidence-building role than becoming problem-solvers. The ARF has expanded its membership, but not its agenda, which is still confined to dialogues and soft confidence-building measures, rather than more concrete measures of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution as originally envisaged. Concerns about sovereignty and non-interference have constrained both ASEAN and the ARF from moving towards measures to address new transnational issues, such as pandemics, environmental pollution and transnational crime, beyond sharing of information and best practices. It remains to be seen whether ASEAN’s current efforts to build a Security Community and draft a Charter will succeed in overcoming the non-interference mindset.

29. The SCO having been inspired by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), has adopted some fairly strong confidence-building measures and has declared its commitment to fight “terrorism, separatism and extremism” in the region. Its strategic importance has been enhanced by the recent rise in oil prices, which has led some to see it as a regional bloc to challenge US dominance in central Asia. In reality, however, the SCO members face numerous internal and external challenges, including the problems of democratisation, radical Islam, and ethnic strife. Inter-state disputes cloud the prospects for regional cooperation over energy resources. And the SCO members have divided allegiance when it comes to the larger powers, with the prospects for a new “great game” rising in keeping with the growing competition over the energy resources of the region.

30. Let me conclude by offering the caveat that I am not in the business of making predictions about the future of Asian geopolitics. Like life, Asian security is marked by both challenges and opportunities, negative and positive trends. But what is important is that there need not be an euphoria about a rising, prosperous and peaceful region, or an Asian century. Asia will assume an increasingly critical role in the future world order, but this would not have a linear trajectory or single outcome. Asia is not fated to be peaceful and prosperous or divided and dangerous. Much will depend on human agency, and the ability of its leaders, regional organizations and civil society actors to put forward visions of progress backed by efforts to steer the region out of the immense challenges it faces.

31. Although Asia is not a coherent region, there is a winning combination here in the natural resources of Central and Southeast Asia, the human resources of China and India, the creative genius of India, the manufacturing might of China, and the technological sophistication of the region’s early economic leaders, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Thinking of new ways and mechanisms that go beyond traditional sovereignty mind-sets, so as to harness these resources for national development and common regional good is Asia’s principal challenges in the 21st century, a challenge to which this conference should dedicate itself.

32. I thank you for your attention.