China: A leader by its deeds?

Dec 6, 2005
China: A leader by its deeds?
By Amitav Acharya
FOR THE STRAITS TIMES

FOLLOWING the collapse of the Soviet Union, China's then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping said: 'Some developing countries would like China to become the leader of the Third World. But we absolutely cannot do that - this is one of our basic state policies. We can't afford to do it and besides, we aren't strong enough.

'There is nothing to be gained by playing that role; we would only lose most of our initiative. China will always side with the Third World countries, but we shall never seek hegemony over them or serve as their leader.'

Deng's position was to 'conceal our capacities and attempt to accomplish something', the latter implying a policy of concentrating China's energies on economic development and national self-strengthening.

But more than a decade and a half later, with its emergence as an economic powerhouse, it is hard to believe China will eschew a leadership role. The question is what type of leadership it would want to exercise.

The issue of Chinese leadership assumes significance in view of the Dec 14 East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur. While China has a key place in the summit, it has been cautious about dominating the event.

On the face of it, this situation may be consistent with Deng's dictum. Some would interpret Deng's words as a classic ploy to buy time to build up China's power until it is in a position to assume a hegemonic position.

Two opposing scenarios have emerged regarding China's hegemonic role in East Asia. One posits a Chinese 'Monroe Doctrine', akin to the sphere of influence that the United States built over its southern neighbours in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The doctrine was exclusionary (especially of the European great powers) and was backed by coercion.

At the other extreme, some have envisaged a return to the Chinese tributary system: a hierarchical but benign inter-state order founded on Chinese notions of its cultural superiority, but offering its lesser members the benefits of trade with, and occasionally protection from, China.

China's potential for regional dominance is growing. It is already the world's fourth-largest economy and the fourth-largest trading nation, and moving higher up the ladder.

It has the world's largest standing army - downsized to 2.3 million men by the end of the year, not including the paramilitary People's Armed Police and reserves, which would increase the total to more than 3.2 million. Even by a conservative count, it is the fifth-largest military spender in the world.

China's relative power over its smaller neighbours, the 10 members of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean), is staggering. Its gross domestic product in 2002 was double that of Asean's, and its military spending was also more than double Asean's.

Still, despite China's rising power, neither of the above scenarios is likely to materialise.

An exclusionary Chinese sphere of influence would be resisted by the US, Japan, and India, among others. The old tributary system did not have to contend with such regional multipolarity. A neo-Confucian Chinese regional order would also be inconsistent with China's professed adherence to the modern principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention in world relations.

Just as a Chinese Monroe Doctrine is unlikely in a multipolar Asia, Confucian notions of hierarchy and governance, matters of debate within China itself, are unlikely to find many believers and followers in a multicultural Asia.
In short, America's past will not be Asia's future. Neither will Asia's past be its future.

But there is considerable scope for Chinese leadership in the region, using instruments that are consistent with the modern principles of international relations.

Leadership involves offering public goods and making sacrifices for the sake of collective interest. The US after World War II helped to rebuild the economies of West European nations and Japan through aid, and contributed to the rise of the newly industrialising countries through market access, even at the cost of suffering huge trade deficits. Its security alliances with East Asian nations, especially Japan, helped these nations to develop their economies.

The Chinese market has been a boon for East Asian exporters, and has played a major role in fuelling the doubling of intra-East Asian trade since 1990. China's decision not to devalue its currency in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 prevented a further aggravation of the crisis.

The most effective exercise of leadership entails not coercion, but consensus-building. To acquire legitimacy, a leader must exercise restraint, especially in dealing with its weaker neighbours. This is the kind of policy that the Suharto-era Indonesia adopted in 1967 when it ended the Konfrontasi (Confrontation) policy towards Malaysia and helped to found Asean.

China has also shown some restraint in dealing with the Spratlys dispute, by agreeing to a Declaration on the Code of Conduct.

China is increasingly engaged in regional institutions like the Asean Regional Forum and forging cooperation in non-traditional security matters, such as pandemics and international relief operations, as seen in its response to the Indian Ocean tsunami last year.

These efforts have paid dividends. Public talk of a China threat is much more subdued today than in the 1990s.

But China is not the only country in the region offering public goods to its followers. Japan is not to be discounted. While there is some uneasiness about recent developments in Japanese security policy, Japan remains a significant provider of investment and aid to the region. And the Japanese technological lead over China and other Asian neighbours is not about to be lost.

India is another regional leader, with its strengths in the knowledge economy. Hence, East Asia may not have just a single dominant source of leadership.

Thus, China can and should lead. But its leadership role is less likely to be resisted if exercised through functional and institutional mechanisms than with a neo-Confucian conception of regional order or through an exclusionary sphere of influence.

I believe China's leaders are acutely conscious of this.

The author is deputy director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore. This article is based on remarks he made at the Beijing Forum (Nov 16-18).